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The institution of the American presidency became remarkably war-prone with the development 
of new resources and a long-term war rational in the post-World War II era. Militaristic 
tendencies were augmented with changes in recruitment processes and media developments after 
the early 1970s. I delineate the logic of the increasing tendency to presidential uses of force for 
political reasons, supply some evidence from the Correlates of War data, and conclude with the 
consequences-both obvious, and more speculative-- of the presidential temptation to war, and the 
legal and constitutional changes that might be adopted to lessen that tendency. 
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Presidents and War 
1The People and their President
 
In a recent post to the History Net discussion forum for diplomatic history (H-diplo) a scholar 
put this query to the list: How can we explain the apparent contradiction between US principles, 
as put forward in the declaration of independence and civic narratives, and US actions in the 
world-- which most observers interpret as bullying, self-interested and unprincipled? Do the 
professed principles apply only within the US, rather than universally?  
 
My response to this question was that one must not confuse "the American people" and their 
executive branch decision makers. The former are, indeed, idealistic, peaceful, egalitarian, and 
inclined to diplomacy and multilateralism. Many polls document this, over many decades.2  
 
Presidents, on the other hand, are inclined toward war and delight in exercising their commander 
in chief powers3, turning to them particularly (one suspects) when their domestic agendas are 
bogged down in Congress, when the economy is weak, when they need a public-distracting 
mechanism in time of scandal, or when an election is near.  They utilize whatever rhetoric 
justifies their discretionary wars, cloaking them in urgency and essential values: the war must be 
fought in the service of American ideals, the survival of democracy, and the defeat of great, 
threatening evil.  
 
Despite our current president’s claims that the animosity of US enemies is directed toward the 
culture and institutions of the nation, polls and interviews in other nations do not support that 
argument. It is, rather, the actions directed by US presidents that are responsible for negative 
international attitudes toward “the United States” among both friends and foes.4 However, the 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank my research assistants Andres O’Hara-Plotnik and Hassan Shamji for their invaluable 
assistance on this paper. 
2 See for example, Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001); and Richard I. Page and Robert Y.Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
3 I use the word “delight” here because the evidence for it is apparent and abundant, from Roosevelt’s proclamation 
that he was switching hats from “Dr. Cure the Depression” to “Dr. Win the War,” to Bush’s May, 2003 landing on 
an aircraft carrier decked out (pun intended) in flight suit and “commander in chief” button to announce to the 
cheering sailors that his mission was accomplished. For an argument about the inherent (perhaps hormonal) drive of 
presidents to make war, see Alexander DeConde, Presidential Machismo: Executive Authority, Military 
Intervention, and Foreign Relations (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2000).  
4 Most recently, a poll by WorldPublicOpinion.org finds that “three out of four Americans believe that in order to 
stabilize Iraq the United States should enter into talks with Iran and Syria, and eight in ten support an international 
conference on Iraq. A majority also opposes keeping U.S. forces in Iraq indefinitely and instead supports 
committing to a timetable for their withdrawal within two years or less .”( “U.S. Public Opinion In Line With Iraq 
Study Group’s Proposals,” PIPA/WorldPublicOpinion.org, found online Dec. 6, 2006). 
On international opinion of Americans and of official U.S. policies,  see the polls reported by 
WorldPublicOpinion.org at 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/index.php?nid=&id=&lb=btvoc; 
and the Pew Global Attitudes Project at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247; ibid, ID=802; and 
ID=804 (all accessed on August 15, 2006). The latter Pew polls suggest, however, that extremely negative opinions 
of the U.S. administration and its policies since the initiation of the war in Iraq have also begun to erode 
international opinion of the American people. The Pew poll of 16 nations in Europe, the Middle East and Asia 
released on June 23, 2005 reports that, although views of the American public are far more positive than views of 
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long presidential campaign to persuade the public that his actions represent the interests of the 
nation has been so effective that it is a well-established habit of media and public to speak of 
“we”, “us” and “the United States” when referring to presidential foreign policy. 
 
That some, or most, of the public accept, for short or long periods, presidential initiation of 
overseas military interventions and the growing burdens of the support apparatus required for an 
active presidential militarism is a separate phenomenon in want of explanation, but that pattern 
should not blind us to the source of “United States” militarism, or lead us to favor cultural and 
economic explanations for phenomena that have a much narrower provenance.  A recent 
chronicle of presidential wars, their rationalizations, and their outcomes can be found in Stephen 
Kinzer’s Overthrow: A Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq;5 A slightly earlier one 
can be found in Alexander DeConde, Presidential Machismo.6  
 
International relations scholars, though still greatly influenced by realist assumptions --despite 
emergent theoretical competitors and challenges to realism’s unitary rational actor assumptions-- 
have long taken a more jaded view of American (and presidential) idealism than have historians. 
IR has mostly accepted that presidents of both parties engage in “diversionary” uses of force to 
distract public attention from domestic problems and create “rally” effects.7 Even these scholars, 
however, tend to assume that, given the risks and costs of war, presidents will be more inclined 
to “threats and displays” of force, stopping short of actual combat.8 The presidency of George 
W. Bush has probably disabused us of that notion. One suspects that even wars that kill and 
maim millions (like the Vietnam War) may have been initiated for personal political or 
ideological reasons that had little to do with rational assessments of national interest.9  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. foreign policy,  “[T]he United States remains broadly disliked in most countries surveyed, and the opinion of 
the American people is not as positive as it once was…. Roughly three-quarters of the publics in Germany (77%), 
Canada (75%) and France (74%) say Bush's re-election has made them feel less favorable toward the U.S. And 
particularly in Western Europe, most of those who express an unfavorable view of the U.S. mostly blame Bush, 
rather than a more general problem with America.” It should be noted that this was a period in which there had been 
a modest rebound from 2003-4, due in large part to US assistance to Tsunami victims and approval for the 
government’s endorsement of democratization. Still, so negative was international opinion of the U.S. role in the 
world that “Majorities in every other country surveyed, aside from the U.S., favor another country challenging 
America's global military supremacy. Americans strongly reject this idea, by 63%-26%.” The percentage favoring 
emergence of a military rival to balance US power ranged from lows of 51-58% (in Canada and Great Britain) to 
highs of 82-85% (in Jordan and France. Eighty-one percent of Indonesians (the highest percentage in the countries 
surveyed) worried that U.S. military might would one day be turned against them. 
5 (NY: Henry Holt and Co., Times Books, 2006). 
6 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2000). 
7 A good recent example of a multivariate test of the “diversionary hypothesis” is Benjamin Fordham, “Partisanship, 
Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Diversionary Uses of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, no. 4 (1998), 
418-39. The diversionary force hypothesis was initially proposed by Charles W. Ostrom and Brian L. Job, “The 
President and The Political Use of Force,” American Political Science Review (APSR) 80 (1986), 541-66. 
8 This is the reasoning embodied in the empirical tests of the diversionary hypothesis by data set pioneers Barry M. 
Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War  (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), 11-12. See, 
for a recent exposition of the hypothesis, its assumptions, and a review of the literature,  William D. Baker, “The 
Dog That Won’t Wag: presidential Uses of Force and the Diversionary Theory of War,” Strategic Insights, vol. 3, 
No. 5 (May, 2004), found online July 25, 2006 at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/may/bakerMay04.asp#author 
9 For the best single book on Vietnam decision-making, see Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: the Last Chance for 
Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001) 
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But individual-level explanations like the “diversionary war” (DW) hypothesis pay little 
attention to the larger institutional context of American militarism. An institutional focus 
includes, but is not limited to the election calendar, the nomination and campaign finance 
systems, the party system, and the bureaucratic resources the president controls…all of which 
empower and tempt the holder of the executive office to make war. A focus on domestic 
institutional context need not ignore the “realist” context of war—the threatening events that 
drive nations to military response—but sees far more discretionary agency in those events that 
presidents would have us believe. Only five times in its history has the United States Congress 
made a constitutional declaration of war, and even in the majority of those cases (the Mexican 
war, the Spanish-American war, and WWI) the presence of vital national interest is arguable. In 
the hundreds of other small and large wars (small, one must qualify, for the U.S., though not 
necessarily for the targets) arguments for the existence of reasonable alternatives to war are quite 
plausible. 
 
Flawed Institutions and Moral Hazards 
 
Institutions are usually defined as the long-lasting rule structures that constrain human action. 
That definition must have been uppermost in the minds of the drafters of the United States 
Constitution, although “constraint” was to fall more heavily on some people than others. The 
most important actors in Philadelphia in 1787 intended to create a national government that 
could effectively regulate and facilitate interstate commerce and perform other functions for the 
national welfare, which powers were mostly vested in the legislature.  However, the Preamble 
clearly sets out the intention to constrain the behavior of U.S. residents (insuring domestic 
tranquility) and of foreigners (providing for the national defense) -- purposes that are the domain 
of executive power. The Constitutional structure itself, with its separation and sharing or power, 
checks and balances, frequent elections, independent judiciary, and legislative power of 
impeachment speaks of a fear of official power, and the need to constrain government actors 
themselves, even while the founders were vesting new powers in the national government at the 
expense of the states.10 The founders wanted both to create governmental capacity and to limit 
potential abuses of power. 
 
Institutions could be constructed, they believed, with such cleverly designed constraints and 
incentives that desired results need not rely on the goodness of human nature (about which they 
were skeptical). Properly designed governing institutions could provide inducements  and 
arrange for competing ambitions and mutual checking and surveillance, and the outcome would 
be good behavior11 12 even (as Kant would say a few years later), for a race of devils.
 
                                                 
10 See, for a brilliant analysis of the motives of key actors and factions at the Constitutional Convention, David B. 
Robertson’s The Constitution and America’s Destiny (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005). According to 
Robertson, James Madison, who considered the president the chief representative and advocate for national (as 
opposed to local) interests, shifted to support for a more expanded presidential power after losing a struggle over 
state representation to the Senate.  
11 James Madison, The Federalist No. 51.  
12 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Carl J. Friedrich, tr., The Philosophy of Kant (New York: Random House, 
1949), 453. 
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But the converse of that proposition is that, with the wrong incentives, and too few constraints, 
institutions can elicit bad behavior. And institutional development from the small seeds sewn in 
Article II HAS brought us to that point, this paper will argue. A rogue presidency, very far from 
what the founders intended or imagined, is having a destructive effect on other institutions, 
domestic and international, that have been painstakingly constructed over centuries13 and 
threatens to embroil the world in virtually endless war. 
 
The presidential war in Iraq, and the Bush administration’s contempt for law and for 
international organization and opinion have produced, from the perspective of administration 
critics, highly negative consequences for both American and international security. But I will 
argue that the foreign policy of the administration merely brings into sharp relief a longer- term 
evolution in the relationship of the presidency to the world and to other domestic institutions, 
developments that were latent in both the explicit and inherent powers of Article II but needed 
several critical conditions to become manifest. Presidential power at least since the 1950s, and 
particularly since the end of the cold war, has gone off track into a realm of imperial expansion 
that is infused with moral hazard.  
 
Presidents have diverse and abundant incentives to make war for personal or political reasons 
unrelated to the national interest, to a universal interest in peace, prosperity, and the expansion of 
human rights, or to the knowledge and intellectual growth of the American public.  What is 
perceived as good for the president’s personal power is often bad for other domestic and 
international institutions, and vice- versa. And the destructive effect of the presidency is not 
merely an outcome of partisan control of the White House or particular personalities. It is 
endemic in the Constitutional configuration of the presidency, interacting with changes in its 
resource base, recruitment processes, and the configuration of global military power. Presidential 
militarism and its correlated neglect of diplomacy and “soft power” will not be reversed by 
short- term partisan change. Only statutory and constitutional changes can modify the perverse 
incentives to destructive behavior now embedded in the institution of the American presidency. 
 
These institutional pathologies are most apparent in foreign policy, because that is where the 
president has the least effective opposition, and the greatest conglomeration of resources, which 
are enhanced by secrecy, loyalty, and powerfully inflammatory rhetoric. Temporary corrections 
to these presidential excesses are won only with extraordinary expenditures of blood and 
treasure, since the most effective challenges to the president’s war powers come in the 
immediate aftermath of presidential wars that incur so much death, debt, and social cost that 
breaches in loyalty, secrecy, and the onus of dissent open up to allow freer criticism and 
debate.14 These moments seem to occur about every generation, with no cumulative learning.  
 
                                                 
13 The use of the term "rogue state" to apply to U.S. adversaries was popularized by U.S. leaders in defense of 
particular weapons systems (particularly the missile defense system) but has been used with increasing frequency to 
apply to the U.S. itself. For two recent examples by Americans, see William Blum, Rogue State (Monroe, Maine: 
Common Courage Press, 2000); and Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation (New York: Basic Books, 2003). 
14 Jonathan Mermin, in Debating Democracy argues that the media do not begin to present arguments and 
information challenging the president’s war policy until and unless prominent Washington politicians begin to 
dispute the president’s framing of the war; failing that, the media seldom question the president’s definition of the 
situation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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The Logic of Institutional Temptation to War 
 
The institutional and personal temptations to war-making (the one facilitating the other) are so 
abundant since World War II that it might be surprising to find any significant, non-random 
patterns that differentiate presidential uses of force by time period or domestic situation. Still, 
there are likely factors that might produce patterned variations. To summarize the most obvious 
assumptions and hypotheses about those temptations: 
 
1. Power seeking   
Presidents, one may assume, want as much power as can be gained productively (that is, without 
incurring costs, like political opposition, that can be counter-productive and lead to increased 
constraints on executive power).15 However, human— and political— nature being what it is, 
there is no guarantee that presidents will recognize when they are about to over-reach and set in 
train events that will sap power.  Determinants of the accuracy of perceptions regarding costs, 
benefits, and probabilities lie within the realm of personality and the structure and capabilities of 
the advice system. As for the match between personality and political situation, there is an 
intriguing suggestion in Stephen Skowronek’s work on the presidency that a party in the 
different stages of regime emergence, development and decline may select a standard bearer of 
greater or lesser risk-taking tendency.16  
 
2. Dominance in foreign policy  
The realm of presidential action is less constrained in foreign policy than domestic policy. 
Article II makes the president commander in chief of the armed forces, and gives him the power 
to appoint and remove generals and department and agency heads, to appoint and receive 
ambassadors, and to make treaties and to command the military forces of the United States when 
called (usually by himself) into battle. As such, he stands at a pinnacle of information, much of it 
inaccessible to the public at the time of initiation of force, information for which he supplies the 
dominant interpretive frame. Thus presidents typically begin their terms with a domestic policy 
agenda, but with the increasing domestic policy difficulty that inevitably emerges, presidents 
usually welcome the transition to “Dr. Win the War.”17 Of course, the president’s perception of 
institutional constraints in the form of partisan considerations may affect his war-making 
decisions.  When his own party controls both houses of Congress, the president’s war-making 
tendency will show less constraint than in divided government, and even a loss of seats without 
loss of control may result in delay or reliance on diplomatic measures short of war. Summarizing 
partisan patterns, William Powell and Jon Pevehouse write, “Historically, presidents emerging 
from midterm election defeats have been less likely to respond to foreign policy crises 
aggressively, and when they have ordered the use of force, they have taken much longer to do 
so…. the White House's propensity to exercise military force steadily declines as members of the  
                                                 
15 The classic statement of this fact, fleshed out with case studies on techniques and opportunities is Richard E. 
Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan, 
Revised ed (Boston: Free Press, 1991). 
16 See note 27. 
17 As Franklin Roosevelt famously described his mission in 1943. 
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opposition party pick up seats in Congress. In fact, it is not even necessary for the control of 
Congress to switch parties; the loss of even a handful of seats can materially affect the 
probability that the nation will go to war.”18
 
3. Resource advantage 
Military and intelligence resources in the executive branch have expanded exponentially since 
World War II, but diplomatic capability has remained a small fraction (less than three percent) of 
military expenditure,19 reflecting the budgetary priorities of the president, and constituting a kind 
of self-fulfilling prophesy (in which alternatives to war have too few advocates and too little 
capacity behind them to dissuade the president from military force). Most of the intelligence 
budget is secret, and relations with his advisors in the war and intelligence agencies are protected 
by national security rationales, as well as executive privilege. Even the doctrines that express the 
president’s guiding policy principles, not to mention the thousands of executive orders he issues 
in foreign policy, may remain secret for years.20 When there are both diplomatic and military 
options in foreign policy, the secrecy, speed, capacity, and loyalty with which intelligence and 
military agencies can execute a policy directive from the president make the use of force an 
attractive option. And while diplomatic powers face many constraints in the world arena, U.S. 
military power is, of course, hegemonic.21  Of course, the preference for war has not prevented 
the expansion of resources for the exertion of “soft” power where it is a useful adjunct to war, or 
a cheaper means of control when conditions for the exertion of military force are unfavorable. 
But it is striking that presidents have invested so little time in rationalizing the defense and state 
department bureaucracies, or the intelligence agencies, so that they work more effectively in the 
service of the nation.22
 
4. Relationship to international corporations 
As American finance, manufacturing and engineering firms became more internationally 
competitive, the cooperative relationship between presidents and elite economic actors was 
strengthened. Convinced, by the late nineteenth century that they must export and acquire  
                                                 
18 William g. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, “When Congress Stops Wars,” Foreign Affairs,  
September/October, 2007 (accessed on line Aug. 22, 2007, at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070901faessay86506/william-g-howell-jon-c-pevehouse/when-congress-stops-
wars.html) 
19 See figure 4.  
20 A prominent example is the 1950 formulation of U.S. cold war policy in NSC 68, which was not declassified until 
1975. On executive orders and presidential power in foreign policy see Kenneth R. Meyer, With the Stroke of a Pen 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), chapter 5; and Philip J. Cooper, By Order of the President 
(Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2002), esp. chapter 6. 
21 Gareth Porter argues that the emergence of hegemonic military status “gave the United states a new freedom of 
action which translated into more aggressive and interventionist policies” and overcame previous reluctance to take 
military actions that might lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Porter argues that this new institutional 
resource advantage (my terminology) was recognized by presidents and their advisors by the end of the Korean War, 
and spurred intervention in Berlin, Iran and elsewhere, ultimately providing the final US temptation to military 
intervention in Vietnam. Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 1-4.  On military contracting ore generally, see P.W. Singer, Corporate 
Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
22 The most recent restructuring of military agencies, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was a congressional, not a 
presidential, initiative; likewise, it was Congress that insisted on thorough investigations into “what went wrong” on 
9-11, and initiated the effort to restructure the intelligence and homeland security agencies. For an organizational 
analysis of 9-11 intelligence failures, see Amy Zegart 
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foreign markets in order to prosper, economic elites pressed new demands on the president for 
help in acquiring and protecting those markets, and from the McKinley administration on, there 
have been a number of natural congruencies among the foreign policy preferences of corporate 
leaders and presidents.23 These include the achievement of  “major player” status in world affairs 
and ultimately military hegemony, to facilitate access to markets and port facilities;24 the spread 
of capitalist values (sanctity of private property; state enforcement of contracts; free trade; access 
to vital raw materials; control of labor relations); state support for a domestic defense industry; 
and generally, the maintenance of profitable investment opportunities and low inflation 
economic growth essential to both corporate boardrooms and presidential hopes for reelection. 
One might add a more recent congruence (since the Reagan administration, expedited in the 
Clinton administration): the development of international firms supplying private contract 
employees for oversees military interventions. 25 These firms, often called into being by 
executive branch policy choices, provide the president with personnel for the implementation of 
foreign policy goals whose deaths are not counted in the daily media enumeration of war 
casualties.26 Because their positions are voluntary and well-paid the deaths and injuries of 
private contractors are less costly to the president than casualties among regular national and 
state guard forces, which receive much more public attention. The repeal of the military draft in 
1971 may have diminished opposition to the Vietnam War among the nation’s youth (and their 
parents), and some liberal congressmembers at that time and subsequently have argued that the 
draft should be reinstituted, in order to keep the potential costs of war visible among the middle 
and upper classes, and thus, presumably, to raise the barrier for less justifiable wars.27
 
5. Rally effect   
Central to hypotheses about the diversionary use of force is the “rally effect.” Defined as a 
“sudden and substantial increase in the public approval of the President that occurs in response to 
certain kinds of dramatic international events that involve the United States,”28 the rally effect 
reached its historic high after the 9-11 attacks, when President George W. Bush experienced a 
jump in his public approval rating from 51% to 86%, trumping his father’s c. 25% increase after 
initiating the first Iraq war in January of 1991, and Kennedy’s 15 % increase for the Cuban 
Missile confrontation.29 Even unsuccessful military events (like the Bay of Pigs in 1961) are 
                                                 
23 See page 14 below. 
24 On the administration’s ambitious plans for opening the Iraq market and oil reserves to American and allied 
corporations, see Naomi Klein, “Bagdad Year Zero,” Harper’s Magazine, September, 2004 (available at 
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6930.htm, accessed April 6, 2007). 
25 By December, 2006, there were almost as many private civilian contractor and subcontractor operatives in Iraq as 
military personnel. They were being used for security, training, planning, accounting, feeding, public relations, 
language translation, construction, and supply operations formerly provided mostly by military forces. Renae Merle, 
“Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq,” Washington Post, December 5, 2006.  
26 Over 770 civilian contractors of U.S. firms have been killed in Iraq, according to Howard Witt, “America’s 
Hidden War Dead,” Chicago Tribune March 26, 2007 
(http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi0703260081mar26,1,5984421.story?coll=chi-news-hed. 
Accessed April 6, 2007).  
27 See, for a recent example, “Rangel Argues for Military Draft at Kennedy School Appearance,” Harvard 
University Gazette February 13, 2003 (found online December 07, 2006, at 
http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/02.13/10-draft.html.  
28 Mark J. Heatherton and Michael Nelson, “Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush and the War on 
Terrorism,” PS Online (www.apsanet.org), January, 2003, 37 (rally percentages extrapolated from Figure One); and 
the formative statement by John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (NY: Wiley and Sons, 1973). 
29 Ibid. 
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followed by rallies, and in the ideal cases (from the point of view of presidential power), a 
significant portion of opposition party and independent voters are converted (for a time) to 
support for the president, and Congress becomes much less critical and more cooperative.30 
Though most rallies are short lived, there is little evidence that presidents anticipate the 
subsequent erosion of public support when initiating a military operation. They may attempt to 
sustain the rally by persuading the public that the danger is ongoing, and even start another war 
before the next election in order to reverse the inevitable decline of approval.31
 
6. Electoral incentives 
The ultimate purpose of a planned rally effect is to win elections and it is generally assumed that 
the president is most concerned about his own reelection. Though other such orderings are 
logically possible, I posit the following prioritization of years in a presidential administration that 
are hypothesized to predict the president’s temptation to discretionary uses of force: A: 
presidential election years; B. the first and second congressional election years of the president’s 
term ; C. odd-numbered years; D. presidential/congressional election years when the incumbent 
is not running for reelection (either because he has announced that he will not, or because it is 
the last year of his legal term). The implication here is that the most peaceful years should be the 
last two of an eight-year term.32  
However, one can imagine reasonable complications to the afore-stated elements of the logic. 
The first congressional election may be the most critical because it strongly affects the support 
he needs to accomplish the program he will take to the voters in his reelection year. But other 
congressional election years could also be quite important if his position vis a vis Congress is 
rapidly deteriorating, if he is threatened with impeachment, and/or embroiled in scandal (the 
Clinton case), or if the economy is doing badly. Further, the first year in office may be, for a 
newcomer, a time to prove one’s mettle by initiating a small military conflict. Lyndon Johnson’s 
August, 1964 bombing in Vietnam, George H. W. Bush’s invasion of Panama in 1989, Clinton’s 
                                                 
30 As Daniel Kahn wrote in the Yale Herald just over a week after 9-11, “Politicians of both parties had only praise 
for Bush following his Thursday address. ‘We want President Bush to know—we want the world to know—that he 
can depend on us,’ Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) said. ‘We are resolved to work together, not as 
Democrats or Republicans, but as Americans.’" See “Tragedies transform Bush’s Presidency,” Yale Herald 
September 21, 2001, page 4 (found online at 
http://www.yaleherald.com/archive/xxxii/09.21.01/news/p4tragedy.html) On the conversion of opponents and 
independents during rallies, a result both of framing and opinion leadership by the administration, as well as simple, 
instinctive patriotism see Richard Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991); and “Crisis, War and Public Opinion: The Media and Public 
Support for the President.” in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, eds, Taken By Storm: The Media, Public 
Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War  (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994) , 210-227. 
31 As Richard Brody writes, “About a year after 9/11…, the accelerating decline in approval ended. News 
commentaries point to a “rally” in support for President Bush that accompanies the shift of attention to Iraq….The 
onset of the war and the initial euphoria over military success was 
accompanied by a ten percentage point gain in approval of the president’s handling of the job.” (“The American 
People and George W. Bush: Two Years of Rally volatility and Grinding Erosion,” unpublished paper, April 1, 
2003. Found online August 16, 2006 at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/bushconf/BrodyPaper.pdf 16-21). 
32 Several considerations contribute to the prediction of fewer resorts to force in the last two years. Besides the 
absence of electoral incentive for the president to make war, there is also the likelihood of weak support in Congress 
for a lame duck president whose party, typically, has steadily lost seats since the first presidential election; 
presidents often manifest a desire to create a more positive legacy as a “man of peace” in he last year; and in cases 
of disastrous presidentially-initiated wars, diplomacy will likely appear relatively more attractive to both president 
and public. 
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1993 bombing attack on Iraq (justified as a response to a plot to assassinate his predecessor), 
Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs, and even Harry Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki could be examples of the phenomenon of “novice macho.” For the sake of 
simplicity, however, let us assume the initially-posited ordering of annual temptations to use of 
force, though the number of reasonable complications to the electoral connection underlines the 
suspicion that, once state-of-the-art military resources became available and their use legitimated 
by public opinion (which the president has great power to affect), the incentive to war-making 
might be virtually omnipresent. 
 
7. Recruitment  
A major change in presidential recruitment took place in the late 1960s, when the Democratic 
Party led a shift from control of nominations by party leaders to presidential nominating 
conventions whose delegates are chosen by self-selected groups of enthusiasts in primaries and 
caucuses. Despite the roughly contemporaneous initiation of new public financing for 
presidential campaigns (matching funds for primaries and large grants for the general election) 
presidential hopefuls were, beginning in 1972, thrown onto their own energies and fund-raising 
capacity. Presidential recruitment now required great ambition and resourcefulness, rather than 
the considered judgment of party leaders among a visible pool of sitting, experienced office-
holders, some of whom may not have relished the activities associated with early fund-raising 
and whirl-wind campaigning for the nomination. Primaries had, of course, existed since the early 
20th century, but under the new rules the percentage of delegates chosen in primaries open to 
anyone claiming a party affiliation shot up from a two-party average of 36 percent in 1968 to 57 
percent under the new rules in 1972, and has grown to 85 percent since 1996.33 Most of the 
remaining delegates were chosen in caucuses of self-selected rank and file (in a handful of 
states), or represented a token number of party officials or “superdelegates” added (back) to the 
mix of delegates to restore a small measure of party official representation at the presidential 
nominating conventions. The net effect of these changes has been to take presidential recruitment 
away from the candidate’s party colleagues and make it a process of self-promotion by those 
with burning ambition and access to a lot of money. My speculation is that this change has 
produced presidents who are even more power-driven, independent of their parties, and 
concerned with personal (as opposed to longer term programmatic and national) advantage; in a 
word, more “plebiscitary.”34 Once in office, they tend to appoint policy makers and 
implementers on the basis of personal loyalty and contribution to nomination victory, rather than 
expertise and party status. Such appointees, dependent on the president’s favor, are probably 
more susceptible to “groupthink” (following the president’s cues rather than providing 
independent advice)35 than traditional partisan luminaries. In all these ways, the recruitment 
changes of the early 1970s may make the president more inclined to unilateral war making. 
 
                                                 
33 Stephen J. Wayne, The Road to the White House 1996 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 11. 
34 The term was popularized by Theodore Lowi in The Personal President (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1984). 
nd35 Irving Janis, Groupthink, 2  ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982). For a view of the presidential cabinet from 
the party era, consider the Lincoln administration where ambitious party leaders (including the president’s major 
political rivals) maintained their independence, even in war time. Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: the 
Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2005). 
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8. Political Time (regime cycle)  
While hypotheses 1, 3, and 7 suggest an increase in presidential uses of force over time, 
plausible inferences from regime cycle theory complicate the expectation for a secular, 
punctuated rise in militarism. The explanation of presidential opportunity differentials developed 
by Stephen Skowronek,36 indicate another source of variation in presidential war-making: the 
relationship of presidents to the dominant regime or its opposition, and the strength of the 
dominant regime. Skowronek suggests that among presidents, the “articulators,” or “faithful 
sons” of the same party that follow the “reconstructor” (realignment) president seem particularly 
prone to war making. Not only do they face increasing factionalism within the majority party 
(which might encourage war-making as a way to unify the party), but also their own ambition 
comes to compete “with the humilities of regime service and personal self-effacement that are 
the trademark of the political project of the faithful son.” Further,  “Enhanced resources for 
independent action and greater national responsibilities strain patience with the demands of 
regime maintenance…”37 Thus, to the bellicosity he observes in articulating presidents James K. 
Polk and Theodore Roosevelt is added (in my own elaboration of Skowronek’s theory) the 
expanded resources of the post-WWII executive branch, capped by the plebiscitary reforms of 
the nomination process implemented in the early 1970s. And indeed, the post-war presidencies 
of Truman, Kennedy and Johnson, and the subsequent post-reform presidencies of the two 
presidents Bush-- articulators all-- do appear remarkably warlike.    
 
Extrapolating further from Skowronek’s theoretical scheme, one might expect to find the lowest 
tendency to use of force among the LAST administrations of a failing regime, the “disjunctive” 
presidents (Hoover and Carter in the modern era) who simply do not have sufficient credibility 
and public support (even in their own parties) to undertake actions so controversial as the 
initiation of war. Likewise, “reconstructing” presidents (like F.D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan) 
would seem to have their hands full enough with the ambitious domestic reforms promised by 
the “party of repudiation” of the old regime; why take on war? And given their great popularity 
and the disrepute of the defeated regime, one imagines they have less need for military 
“diversions.”  The fourth category, the “preemptive” presidents who represent the party of the 
old regime elected in some sort of fluke during a temporary disorganization of the regime party, 
yield no clear predictions. One may speculate, however, that the obstacles to domestic reform 
presented by the strength of the dominant regime party may make military action even more 
attractive. And the active military presidencies of Wilson, Eisenhower, Nixon and Clinton seem 
to support that speculation. 
 
To summarize, then, the foregoing eight hypotheses suggest that, because of its independent 
presidency and mega-resources, the U.S. should have greater involvement in militarized disputes 
than other democracies, at least after World War II; that militarization should further increase 
after August, 1974 (that is, in the administrations in which the president has been nominated—or 
in Ford’s unusual case, looks forward to being nominated—under the reformed primary/caucus 
system for choosing delegates to the nominating convention); that use of force should be greater, 
ceteris paribus, in presidential re-election years, and secondly, in congressional election years, 
than in off-years, in that order (though we would not be surprised to find that the first odd-
                                                 
36 The Politics Presidents Make (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/ Belknap, 1993). 
37 Ibid, 329. In the former case, “While Polk was pressing Congress to enact his full-service agenda, he was 
simultaneously pressing a war that would crown the old program with personal achievement” (328).  
10  
numbered year of a new president’s administration is MORE war-prone than OTHER odd-
numbered years, and the last two years of a lame-duck president’s administration are LESS war-
prone than the average of other years); we should see, after WWII, a growing preference for 
military over diplomatic resources in presidential budget requests; and finally, articulators should 
be more war-like than other presidents, and disjunctive presidents the least war-like, with 
reconstructive and preemptive presidents falling between these two.  
 
These hypotheses are non-committal about the effect on presidential uses of military force of the 
existence of an over-riding ideology that proclaims the need for permanent military 
preparedness. However, it is plausible to assume that the Cold War enhanced the war-proneness 
of presidents in the period 1946-1989. What should we see AFTER the Cold War? The fading of 
a convenient rationale for war coincides with the presentation of the United States as the only 
remaining super-power, and that situation may be seen as an increased opportunity to war-
making by American presidents. Or, we may see, with the passage of time, that the “inter-war” 
period (1989-2001) was merely an interlude, and the anti-communist rationale for militarism was 
replaced within barely a decade by a war on terrorism which conferred on presidents of both 
parties an excuse for bellicosity on a par with the Cold War years. And of course both the Cold 
War and the war on terror may be seen as presidential constructions. That does not suggest that 
the threats in both ideological eras were not genuine, just that the mode by which presidents 
confronted them may have been particularly, and unnecessarily, reliant on military force, and 




If presidential government in the United States made discretionary military action more attractive 
here than in other democracies ONCE the resources and legitimation for an active foreign policy 
came into being, crude comparisons of national rates of engagement in militarized disputes may 
offer some confirmation of broad trends and country differences. Table One uses the data 
compiled by the Correlates of War Project (COW), Militarized Interstate Disputes, v. 3.02 (MID 
3.02) and simply sorts the disputes in which the U.S., United Kingdom, France, and 
Russia/Soviet Union were involved during the 1816-2001 period. “Militarized Interstate 
Disputes”(MIDs) are defined by the COW project as  “conflicts in which one or more states 
threaten, display, or use force against one or more other states.”38  They thus include many uses 
of armed forces in which no lives are lost, as well as small- and large-scale wars between states. 
Table One displays the counts of participation in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), and the 
propensities for such disputes (defined by the ratio of MIDs divided by total years) for different 
eras in the US, France, and the UK, with Russia/Soviet Union added for comparison with another 
post-WWII super-power. 
 
                                                 
38  From the COW web site, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
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39Table 1: MIDs  and MIDs/Year for US, Russia, France, UK 
 
401816-2001 





USA 345 1.855 127 0.977 218 3.893
Russia 341 1.833 146 1.123 195 3.482
France 174 0.935 121 0.931 53 0.946
United Kingdom 263 1.413 166 1.277 97 1.732
Total MIDs 1123 560 563 
 
Post-WWII      US 
MIDs by Era 
Propensity 
(n) (n/yrs) 
1946-74                  103       3.552
  
1975-90                     71 4.438
  
1991-2001                     44      4.000
 
Table 1 provides some support for the hypotheses. While the U.S. rate of participation in 
militarized disputes is about the same as that of France, and predictably lower than that of the 
non-democratic Russian empire and the United Kindgom, the era’s hegemon in the 19th century 
and first half of the 20th, the U.S. moves well ahead of the other major power democracies after 
World War II. Its militarism (almost four MIDs per year) is approached only by its non-
democratic (for most of the period) super-power rival, the Soviet Union.  
 
In sum, for the entire post-war period, having acquired both the means to involve itself in 
military conflicts and an enduring, presidentially-constructed ideological rationale for doing so, 
the U.S. became twice as militaristic as the U.K., nearly four times as militaristic as France, and 
12 percent more militaristic than its super-power competitor. 
 
The  MID data set contains a large number of disputes that, while involving threats or 
mobilization of military units, are little more than posturing. One way to whittle down the MIDs 
to the more serious confrontations is to include only those disputes that result in fatalities. While 
it is ludicrous to count both World War II and the 1983 invasion of Grenada as equal disputes, 
the reduction does serve to separate major uses of force from mere displays or threats. Table 
Two repeats the country comparisons using the smaller set of MIDs with American fatalities. 
 
                                                 
39 Table I includes all Militarized Interstate Disputes (including those with missing data for number of fatalities, 
labeled –9), as listed by the Correlates of War Project  (Homepage: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/), “Militarized 
Interstate Disputes (v3.02). This data set records all instances of when one state threatened, displayed, or used force 
against another.” 
40 In this column, the end date is August 15, 1945; the next begins August 16. 
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41Table 2: MIDs with Fatalities , Counts and Rates/Year for US, Russia, France, UK 
 
1816-2001 





USA 30 .161 6 0.046 24 .429
Russia 28 .150 16 0.123 12 .214
France 29 .156 17 0.131 12 .214
United Kingdom 17 .091 8 0.062 9 .161
Total MIDs 104 47 57 
 
Post-War Fatal 
US MIDs by Era (n) N/yrs 
1946-74    (29 yrs)                  13       .448
  
1975-90    (16 yrs)                    9 .562
  
1991-2001 (11 yrs)                    2      .182
 
The relationships in Table Two are similar to those in Table One. The U.S. moves from a 
relatively low rate of fatal confrontations42 to the highest of the four countries in the post-war 
era. In those 56 years, U.S. militarism is two or three times as high as the other major power 
democracies, and twice as high as that of the Soviet Union.  
 
In both Tables 1 and 2 there is evidence for the hypothesis that, within the highly interventionist 
Cold War period, there is a secular shift to greater militarism after the nomination reforms take 
effect (with Gerald Ford in August, 1974). In both the larger (all militarized disputes) and the 
smaller (disputes with fatalities) data sets, cold war militarism registers about a 25% increase in 
the reformed nomination period. This increase is also supported by older data compiled by John 
M. Collins in his 1991 compendium, America’s Small Wars,43 which found a secular increase 
from 15 “small wars” in the decade 1960-69, to 19 in 1970-79 (a 27% increase), and 23 in the 
Reagan reconstruction decade, 1980-89 (a 53% increase over the 1960s).   
 
In both the MID data sets used in Tables One and Two, the end of the cold war registers a sharp 
drop in militarism (along with significant reductions in military spending, as indicated by Figure 
1 below). However, one suspects that this is only the lull before a new era of higher militarism, 
with the emergence of a new rationale for military readiness after 9-11-2001. Although the MID 
data set ends in 2001, President George W. Bush’s initiation of two major wars in his first three 
                                                 
41 In the COW data, this includes only fatality levels scored from 1 (1-25 deaths) through 6 (over 999 deaths) on the 
U.S. side; In Table  two, confrontations in which fatalities are unknown (scored–9) are excluded. 
42 It should be noted that the COW data counts only the deaths of soldiers and not civilians, and it is likely that 
deaths in the U.S. are reported more accurately than those in the target state.  
43 Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s US, Inc. (Macmillan), 1991), 16. Collins counts a sharp increase in the number of 
small wars (area-focused low-intensity conflicts) from the first four decades of the 20th century (an average of 4.5 
small wars per decade in the years from 1899-1939) to 10 in the 1940s and 11 in the 1950s. (Ibid). 
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years would give him a militarism-with-fatalities ratio of .500 in his first term, comparable to 
cold war levels. 
Politics and Militarized Interstate Disputes 
 
Table 3 displays the propensity to engage in militarized disputes by administration and party. For 
this table, only disputes with some level of fatalities are counted, in order to explore patterns of 
militarism with serious consequences (that is, beyond mere threats and displays). 
 
Table 3: Militarism in the U.S. Since 1897, By Administration and Party 
 
President      Party          Yrs in Office Fatal MID's Propensity Fatal MID's Propensity
 (excl. -9) (excl.. -9) (incl. -9) (incl. -9) 
McKinley (3/4/1897-9/14/1901) R     4.50 2 0.444 2 0.444
T. Roosevelt (9/14/01- 3/3/09) R      7.50 0 0.000 0 0.000
Taft (3/4/09- 3/3/13) R                    4.00 0 0.000 0 0.000
Wilson (3/4/13-3/3/21) D                8.00 2 0.250 9 1.125
Harding (3/4/21- 3/2/23) R             2.00 0 0.000 0 0.000
Coolidge (3/2/23-3/3/29) R             6.00 0 0.000 1 0.167
Hoover (3/4/29-3/3/33) R                 4.00 0 0.000 0 0.000
F. Roosevelt (3/4/33-4/12/45) D      12.08 3 0.248 3 0.248
Truman (4/12/45-1/20/53) D           7.75 2 0.258 2 0.258
Eisenhower (1/20/53-1/20/61) R     8.00 1 0.125 4 0.500
Kennedy (1/20/61- 8/22/63) D         2.67 1 0.375 3 1.124
Johnson (8/22/63-1/20/69) D           5.42 6 1.108 8 1.477
Nixon (1/20/69-8/9/74) R                 5.58 1 0.179 1 0.179
Ford (8/9/74-1/20/77) R                   2.42 2 0.769 2 0.769
Carter (1/20/77-1/20/81) D              4.00 1 0.250 1 0.250
Reagan (1/20/81-1/20/89) R            8.00 5 0.625 8 1.000
Bush (1/20/89-1/20/93) R                 4.00 1 0.250 1 0.250
Clinton (1/20/93-1/20/01)                 8.00 1 0.125 1 0.125
     
Total MIDs 28. 46.  
   Democrat Total  16. 27.  
   Republican total 12. 19.  
Dem. Propensity (MIDs/total years)   0.336   0.564  
    Dem. AVG (Sum  Prop./# of Pres.)   0.374   0.646  
Rep. Propensity (disp./total years)   0.209   0.338  
    Rep. AVG (Sum Prop./# of Pres.)   0.217   0.301  
 
The Correlates of War Project was sometimes unable to ascertain the precise number or level of 
fatalities, even in very serious conflicts; there are numerous –9 (missing data) entries in conflicts 
at levels 7 (“Show of Force”) through 16 (“Attack”). It is thus not unreasonable to assume that 
cases with missing data may actually involve fatalities, since reasonable certainty about a 
nonviolent outcome would be reflected in incident coding of zero fatalities. Table 3 presents both 
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data selections: MIDs with fatalities excluding missing data, and MIDs with fatalities including 
those conflicts with missing data in the “fatalities” column.  While the counts vary significantly, 
the patterns do not.  After the McKinley administration, the propensity to use force in 
confrontations that result in U.S. fatalities drops, but rises significantly after World War II. This 
pattern is understated by the decision of the COW Project to include only one entry for big wars 
that go on for years. 
 
With or without the MIDs with unknown fatalities, the data in Table 3 reveal that Democrats are, 
across the entire century, significantly more likely to engage in serious militarized disputes than 
are Republicans. The first Democratic president of the modern era, Woodrow Wilson, not only 
intervened in Mexico, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, but sent American forces 
into Russia and, of course, prodded his reluctant party and nation into World War I. The 
Republican presidents of the interwar period were, by comparison, pacifists; and it was a 
Democratic president, Harry Truman, who took the opportunity presented him to rally the 
democratic world to a new structure of alliances and institutions and develop a founding 
ideology that would provide justification for countless military interventions—overt and 
covert—for forty five years.  
 
Republicans begin to catch up with Democratic militarism (in terms of numbers of MIDs, if not 
casualty levels) in the Reagan administration.44 And while Republicans have yet to match the 
fatality levels of the discretionary Korean and Vietnamese wars, the present administration 
resembles the pattern of Cold War Democrats much more than did earlier Republicans-- 
evidence that the “war on terror” is indeed “the new Cold War.”  
 
The first two rows of Table 4 confirm, in the smaller data set of disputes with fatalities, the 
secular increase in militarism that was inaugurated with the Spanish American War. The war 
with Spain resulted in momentous “imperial” responsibilities to govern the acquired territories 
and subdue the Philippine insurrection. The new era was spurred by the country’s rise to 
economic maturity and the belief that arose after the great depression of the 1890s among 
economic and political elites (and widely shared among other sectors of the citizenry as well) 
that the country had to export its economic surplus and have coaling stations and captured 
markets to facilitate the movement of capital and produce. Military strategists, presidents and 
upper class national officials concurred in the new expansionist ideology at the turn of the 
century and won a major victory with the successful overseas war to liberate peoples to whom 
the U.S. subsequently refused independence.45
 
In the data in Table 4 (both iterations, with and without the –9 category of fatalities), as well as 
the presidency figures of Table 3, Democratic militarism peaks in the Kennedy/Johnson 
administrations. The Republican peak appears later, in and after the Reagan administration.  If 
the nomination reforms of the 1970s provide a spur to plebiscitary militarism it appears to be 
felt—in these data on fatal confrontations—mostly among the Republican presidents who 
dominate the era.  
                                                 
44 The highest (American) fatality level for the Reagan administration occurred as a result of the so-called peace-
keeping mission in Lebanon from 1982-84, in which 241 Marines were killed.  
45 Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux, 2002); Harold Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez-Faire, 1897-1917 (New York: Rinehart, 1951. 
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But the post-reform and post-cold war periods are still too short for confident generalization. 
Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton were unusual cases in that Carter was (as Skowronek labels the 
category) a “disjunctive” president at the end of his rope, trying desperately to keep the northern 
and southern wings of his fragile party together; and Clinton was a “preemptive” president, 
elected in a three-way election, facing a militant opposition in control of Congress after his first 
two years. If Carter had too little legitimacy to make war, even with his own party in control of 
Congress, the interloper, Clinton, hounded by a regime party that considered him an illegitimate 
rascal, in an era in which a 45-year long ideology justifying presidential militarism had suddenly 
vanished, could only take on small scale interventions for human rights and for keeping Saddam 
Hussein in his “box.”      
The only “political time” hypothesis confirmed by these data is seen in the pattern for disjunctive 
presidents Hoover and Carter. Theirs is the lowest level of fatal military confrontations. The 
highest, surprisingly, is the reconstructive cell in the first row.  The propensity for war is 
measured two ways in Table 4: the chance that a year will register a fatal militarized dispute, 
considering all years under one of the four Skowronekian types of administration, and the 
average annual propensity for war of presidents grouped in each of the four types, taking the sum 
of administration propensities to war and dividing by the number of presidents in that category. 
By the first measure, militarism is highest among the presidents inaugurating new regimes; by 
the second, reconstructors are almost tied with preemptives in one of the comparisons (line 4). 
One must note, of course, that these counts of MIDs treat all militarized incidents equally, 
regardless of scale. Roosevelt’s global war, forced on him by circumstances, counts equally with 
the much smaller discretionary war of McKinley, and the small-fatality interventions of Ronald 
Reagan in Lebanon, Nicaragua, Libya and Grenada. 
 
Likewise, if one considered scale and cost, the discretionary wars of Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, 
and both Bushes would make articulators the leading militarists. And, given that the modal 
number of years since World War II had passed under articulating presidents, the contribution of 
this category of post-realignment partisans to militarism is clear. 
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Table 4:  Militarism by Era and “Political Time” 
Pre-WWII MIDs with Fatalities Propensity 
(incl -9)                  (n) MIDs/yrs 
1816-1897                6           .069
1898-1940              13          .302
            
MIDs with Fatalities, by Era, Party 
Mid #s and Propen-
sities (excl. –9) 
Mid #s and Propen-
sities (Include –9)    
  Dem Rep. Dem Rep. 
1 1898-Aug. 1945 MID's                  (n) 5 2 12 3
1898-Aug. 1945 Prop. (MID's/total yrs)  .249 .068 .597 .103
21898-Aug. 45 AVG (Prop./# of Pres.)     .249 .074 .686 .102
Sept. 1945-1974 MID's                   (n) 9 2 13 5
Sept. 1945-74 Prop (MID's/total years)2 .577 .147 .834 .368
Sept. 1945-74 AVG (Prop./# of Pres.)2 .580 .152 .756  339
1975-89 MIDs                                 (n) 1 7 1 10
41975-89 Propensity .250 .603 .250 .862
31975-89 AVG .250 .697 .250 .885
1990-2001 MID's                            (n) 1 1 1 1
1990-2001 Prop. (MID's/total years)  .125 .250 .125 .250
1990-2001 AVG (Prop/# of Pres.)  .125 .250 .125 .250
MIDs with Fatalities, Political Time 
Disjunctive Reconstructive Articulating Preemptive  
Propensity (omitting -9) 0.125 0.408 0.254 0.217
  AVG (omitting -9) 0.125 0.439 0.249 0.290
 
Propensity (including -9) 0.125 0.529 0.381 0.531
  AVG (including -9) 0.125 0.564 0.409 0.539
  AVE, Shifting  Panama from RR to    
                .441           GHWB                   0.522
MID  Count Including -9 1 13 15 17
  AVG, Shifting  Panama  from 
  RR to GHWB 12 16
     
Presidents in Category Hoover  McKinley T. Roosevelt  Wilson 
 Carter  F. Roosevelt  Taft  Eisenhower 
  Reagan  Harding  Nixon 
   Coolidge  Ford  
   Truman  Clinton 
   Kennedy   
   Johnson   
   Bush I  
Years in Office  8 24.58 39.34 32
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The Electoral Connection 
 
The MID data are particularly unsuited for testing hypotheses about electoral cycles and 
militarism. Actual interventions are often contained within long disputes, dated from their first 
appearance. Wars of several years are usually listed only once, when they start, and incidents 
causing fatalities are often hard to pinpoint. One such problem is the attribution of the MID with 
Panama to Reagan, rather than the president (G. H. W. Bush) who actually invaded that country 
in late 1989. Since this is an important use of force, and one incurring significant casualties, I 
added a line to Table 4 subtracting the fatal MID with Panama from Reagan’s total and moving it 
to President George H.W. Bush (see italics).  
 
Similarly, as Benjamin Fordham and Christopher Sarver have noted, it is not always clear who 
has initiated a conflict, and some important military interventions are excluded because they are 
not judged to comprise interstate disputes. There are also a large number of “disputes” in the 
data set that remain verbal, or which were initiated by low-level officials or private actors-- 
hardly useful for assessing serious presidential efforts to produce rallies.46 In view of the 
problems in the COW data, Fordham and Sarver have created their own data set of U.S military 
interventions, relying more on the Blechman and Kaplan data, with updates and modifications 
(for example, they include covert actions and disputes with foreign non-state actors). Subsequent 
analysis using this revised data set has employed sophisticated statistical procedures to explore 
the interaction of party (and presumed constituency policy preferences) and economic conditions 
with presidential use of force.47 Fordham’s article finds that, indeed, there is a differential 
incidence of force by presidents of the two parties, depending on whether the major problem in 
the economy is inflation or unemployment.  
 
However, the Fordham and Sarver data set also contains many relatively trivial movements of 
armed forces that may be virtually invisible to the public, and thus of questionable significance 
as “political” uses of force. One way to address that problem is to include a screen for visibility: 
coverage of the incident in a major national newspaper. I have collected about a thousand New 
York Times articles, using the Proquest Historical Newspapers database, and intend to use these 
accounts in the near future to assess the visibility (and thus potential political capital) inherent in 
each of the proposed incidents of military force from 1946 to the present. With a newly 
constructed data set of visible uses of non-trivial military force, I intend to assess the electoral 
hypothesis ranking the discrete years of a presidential administration as an independent variable 
indicative of presidential political needs. Most other studies of the diversionary hypothesis have 
considered only presidential election years, or have demarcated the electoral cycle in 
inappropriate ways. 
 
When constructing my own data set of presidential uses of force, I will follow Fordham and 
Sarver (and diverge from the COW practice) by also including major covert actions (like those in 
Iran, Guatemala, and Chile), IF the resulting regime changes receive publicity in the New York 
Times as the president appears to claims credit (without admitting involvement) for the results. 
Covert actions, initiated in the post-war period by Eisenhower, provide the president with an 
                                                 
46 Benjamin O. Fordham and Christopher C. Sarver, “Militarized Interstate Disputes and United States Uses of 
Force,” International Studies Quarterly 45 (2001), 455-466. 
47 See note seven. 
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economical method of intervention carrying fewer risks than overt military interventions. As 
Eisenhower discovered, it could be quite easy to effect the overthrow of a pesky regime-- so easy 
that he employed it twice in countries that experienced, as a result of his actions, very high costs 
that are with us still; and he gave the go-ahead for the Bay of Pigs intervention whose plans his 
successor, President Kennedy inherited and executed.  
 
Military versus Diplomatic Budget Requests 
 
As their military and intelligence resources for overt and covert military actions grew, the 
attractiveness of peaceful dispute resolution through diplomacy faded. Figures 1-5 display 
presidential budgetary requests for Defense Department and State Department funding, in both 
actual and inflation-adjusted dollars. Despite the different trend lines (punctuated with Korean, 
Vietnam, and post-9-11 elevations in military spending, compared to a gradual rise in diplomatic 
budgets), the ratio of diplomatic to military budget requests remains virtually the same at the 
beginning of the sequence, in the late-1940s, and the end, in 2004: the presidential request for 
diplomatic resources is just over two percent of his request for military resources.  
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Congressional response to presidential budget requests ( Fig. 5) is clearly affected by party. In 
the post-Korean and Vietnam eras, and again in the Reagan years, Democratic congresses 
generally constrained presidential defense budgets; in the Clinton years Republican congresses 
sought modest additions to presidential budgets for military spending. However, it is not 
plausibly within the power of Congress to effect a reorientation of presidential foreign policy 




If the arguments presented here are correct, a set of executive branch institutions has arisen since 
World War II, at the behest of the president, and justified on the basis of presidential foreign 
policy doctrines, that encourage and facilitate presidential war-making. These tendencies have 
been augmented further by the “plebiscitary’ aspects of party nomination reforms since 1972. 
Clearly there are serious consequences here for American political development, world peace, 
and the development of international institutions for non-violent dispute resolution and the 
fostering of international law and human rights. 
 
Nationally, military spending has consumed the lion’s share of national budgets, leaving fewer 
resources for domestic social and infrastructure needs and, in the years of peak spending, 
deforming the domestic economy. And most importantly, millions of lives have been lost, lands 
and infrastructure destroyed, and millions of other lives darkened and impoverished by mental 
and physical injuries, and the loss of loved ones. 
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These pathologies inhere in the very nature of executive power, of course. The American 
founders wanted precisely to avoid the pathologies of monarchical identification with national 
interest, the pursuit of war for ego-gratification, booty, or dynastic motives. Democracy offers a 
constraint on such motives, with more or less effectiveness across time and different national 
institutions, but cannot abrogate them. Richard Nixon’s famous justification of his executive 
prerogatives to David Frost (“When the President does it, that means that it is not illegal”) did 
not travel far from “L’etat, c’est moi.”    
 
Despite the costs, Americans have become so accepting of loose interpretations of executive 
power in the realm of war powers that media and opposition party routinely comment on 
candidates’ fitness for commander in chief responsibilities, and find them wanting if they seem 
insufficiently bold.  Such expectations probably lie behind Hilary Clinton’s votes for the war in 
Iraq and for condemnation of Iran in a resolution that could have been interpreted as preparation 
for war. Barack Obama was criticized (by Clinton, and Republicans) for his remarks in favor of 
diplomatic engagement with Iran and other “enemies,” and even in an era of disenchantment 
with the outcomes of presidential war policy, such challenges to “war mettle” are sure to be 
heard again as the election nears. 
 
A little-noticed effect of presidential preoccupation with war, and its acceptance in American 
political culture, may have been to unbalance gender relations in the United States, reducing the 
numbers of women in elective office, mitigating against the kinds of public policy favored by 
women, and perhaps against the Democratic Party women disproportionately favor.48
 
Despite the facts that the U.S. was host to a pioneer feminist movement, and has a very high 
percentage of women working outside the home, women hold only 16% of seats in the U.S. 
Congress, far below the percentages in almost all other democracies. The U.S. ranks about 60th in 
the world in women’s political representation, with less than half the percentage of the 
Scandinavian countries. And of course, no woman has yet served as president of the United 
States, in contrast with the profusion of female prime ministers in other industrial democracies, 
and even in developing countries. In a composite measure of the gender gap in well-being (which 
ranks countries according to gender equality in economic well-being, political empowerment, 
education, and health), the U.S. ranks only 17th 49 among democracies
 
Could it be that the presidentially-constructed emphasis of American foreign policy on war has 
handicapped female candidates for both Congress and the presidency because women are not 
trusted to govern in times of war? The number of women entering Congress surged in the 
relatively peaceful, post-cold war 1990s. However, it dropped precipitously after 2000. Perhaps 
the post-cold war era of peace and military reconversion enhanced women’s political 
representation because the issues with which women are associated gained more attention at the  
                                                 
48 Of the 70 women in the current (109th) House of Representatives, 50 (70 %) are Democrats; eleven of the 16 
women in the  Senate (69 %) are Democrats.  
49 Augusto Lopez-Claros and Saadia Zahidi, “Women’s Empowerment: Measuring the global Gender Gap,” World 




expense of security issues. After 2001, not only did female candidates become weaker 
competitors, but the percentage of the public finding women emotionally and otherwise fit to 
hold high office experienced a significant decline.50  
 
These patterns provide some evidence that the militarization of American society, led by the 
president, imprints governing institutions and makes them less welcoming to "feminine" values. 
And the political under-representation of women, in turn, yields a Congress more favorable to 
military than social policy.51  The very low percentage of American women in the national 
legislature compared to other countries is otherwise difficult to account for.  Awaiting further 
study, we merely speculate that, following the logic presented here, the  "militarization of 
institutions” [promoted by presidential preferences in foreign policy] produces an electoral 
gender bias diminishing the representation of women in government, which, in turn, maintains 
the large defense establishment and militates against congressional restraint of presidential war 
powers. 
 
Institutional pathology in the presidency thus has many complex political, social, and economic 
consequences. History and institutional logic suggest that remedies will only be found in the 
interludes between disastrous wars, or through legal and constitutional changes. Possible such 
changes include a reversal of the 1968-72 “reforms” of the nomination process and changes in 
campaign finance laws, in order to bind presidents more closely to their parties; sharp cutbacks 
in defense spending and more transparency in military and intelligence agencies; increases in 
diplomatic capacity and reorganization of the State Department to enhance its effectiveness; 
amendment of the Constitution to give the president one six-year term (removing the largest 
electoral incentive to war-making); or even a constitutional shift to parliamentary government. 
 
Serious pathology demands drastic remedy.    
 
                                                 
50 David W. Moore, “Poll Analyses, June 10, 2003” Gallup News Services (found online December 7, 2006 at 
http://www.ms.uky.edu/~stari/STA200/pool_example2.htm) 
51 Gender gaps in American national politics (affecting candidate and policy preferences) have been documented 
since 1980. The new Homeland Security committee in the House has NO women, and there are very few on the 
Armed Services Committees. 
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